

Appendix A

Method of Conducting the Poll Closing Observation Project

Appendix A

Method for Conducting the Poll Observation Project

RESEARCH:

Coalition members first researched Florida statutes, state and county procedure and training manuals, and other guidance applicable for opening, running, and closing polling places. This required making public records requests for some materials not readily available. It required research into the separate procedures for early voting and Election-day voting.¹

WORKSHEETS, INSTRUCTIONS, AND TRAINING:

From its research, the report team prepared materials we could use to train and deploy our volunteers; this consisted of worksheets for compiling observations and written instructions for doing so. These materials emphasized gathering uniformly formatted data, ballot accounting and security concerns across multiple sites, by our volunteer observers. This was a complex task because so many different items might be observed, reported and analyzed. The team spent several days determining the best way to focus on ballot accounting and reconciliation, signature and certificate counting and security issues. The goal was to focus on those aspects most relevant to ballot reconciliation, and to maximize accuracy both in training and data reporting.²

For Election-day the report team further refined the process by grouping observers into 2-person teams. One member observed closing procedures to do with paper materials – signature counts, absentee ballots, provisional ballots and forms. The second observer watched those procedures that dealt with

¹ The Coalition expressly limited this study to early voting and election-day voting. This leaves out absentee voting. Absentee voting procedures are significantly different and there was no simple way to fold observations of absentee balloting into this study. The public would be well-served by a careful study of the absentee ballot process, especially given the documented fraud problems in a 1997 Miami-Dade County election and the greater potential for abuse now that the Florida legislature has removed the requirement that an absentee ballot signature be witnessed.

² For early voting, an “EVC” (Early Voting Closing) worksheet was designed and used. For Election-day, two “E-DAY” worksheets were designed and used - “A” worksheets for paper and “B” worksheets for machine observations. Therefore we used “EVC” to observe early voting closing procedures and “E-DAY-A” and “E-DAY-B” to observe Election-day closing procedures. Each worksheet was tailored to show the watcher how to determine if election workers were conducting their activities according to prescribed procedures. Space was also left for general observations that observers thought important.

closing out machines – uploading results to the PEB, printing the results tape, etc. Unfortunately we were not able to staff all precincts with two-member teams.

We prepared written instructions to familiarize observers with conditions, people, and activities that they could expect at the poll-closing, and on events to monitor. The instructions also informed volunteers of their rights and the limits on their role in attending poll-closings. Observers were told never to interfere with poll-closing procedures, but to assert their right to be there, and to always remain respectful and courteous toward election workers who would be at the end of long, exhaustive days. We also provided volunteers with immediate contact information for MDERC team members who would be on stand-by to assist them with questions or difficulties. Observers were also told to return of their completed worksheets promptly to MDERC..

On the Sunday before Election-day, MDERC also conducted a live training session for observers. Experienced coalition volunteers were on hand to share success strategies with first-timers. Additionally, the report team briefed the group about specific procedures and policies that the County was implementing that observers had seen during two weeks of early voting observations. There was plenty of time for questions, answers, and discussion was afforded the group, and volunteers displayed a sound grasp of their tasks by the end of it.

POLLING PLACE SELECTION

The Coalition used three criteria to select polling places. First, MDERC had carried out a pilot project observing several polling places for the March and August 2004 elections. Those precincts were chosen from a list developed by the Florida ACLU of the 31 precincts that reported the most problems during the September 2002 election. These precincts would provide benchmarks for our observations allowing us to see if procedures had improved or deteriorated over time. Second, the Coalition looked at the rest of the polling places identified as problem precincts in 2002. Finally, MDERC focused on polling places that either did not report signature counts on Certificate No. 2 in the August 2004 primary or that reported a mismatch between counts.

Next, MDERC selected for observation all polling places that met all three criteria. Then, the Coalition factored racial and ethnic diversity into the selection. Polling places that were majority Black precincts or majority Hispanic precincts received preference. Finally, the Coalition targeted polling places

across the County to obtain geographic diversity, language diversity, and precincts with higher population density.

POLLING PLACE ASSIGNMENTS

In assigning observers to polling places, MDERC did three things. First, the report team asked the volunteers if they had a specific polling place they wanted to observe. Some experienced observers opted to observe a targeted precinct they had observed before where they may have established a rapport with election workers. Some volunteers wanted to observe polling places that shared their race or ethnicity. Next, the Report Team inventoried volunteers' whereabouts and willingness to travel, and made assignments accordingly to best cover our target polling places. Finally, the team tried to pair up more experienced volunteers with less experienced volunteers.

Before, during, and after the two-week election window, the report team remained on call, logging incident reports and assisting volunteers with questions and challenges encountered. It was helpful to provide continuing access to volunteers by landline phones, cell phones, fax, email, and regular mail throughout the period.

COMPILATION OF OBSERVATION DATA:

After each day of the election, the volunteers sent back completed worksheets to the report team. (MDERC will make copies of these reports available upon request) Report-team members analyzed the data, consolidating like observations and categorizing findings. Observation data was divided into five categories, Transparency, Ballot Accounting, People, Paper and Machines. This data was then collated into a **Summary of Observations. (Table 1)**

Appendix B

**MDERC October 22, 2004 Letter to
County Manager and Supervisor of Elections**



miami-dade election reform coalition

October 22, 2004

Via Facsimile and E-Mail

Constance A. Kaplan
Supervisor of Elections
Miami-Dade County, Florida
2700 NW 87th Avenue
Miami, FL 33172

Re: Poll Closing Procedures

Dear Supervisor Kaplan:

Since the start of early voting, representatives from the coalition have been on hand trying to observe poll opening and poll closing procedures. We write to report our preliminary findings as they relate to poll closings. As detailed below, we have found that certain of the procedures being followed by the Miami-Dade County contravene state law. However, it may simply be that Miami-Dade procedures are not being scrupulously followed by the county's poll closing teams and that all that is needed is to re-emphasize that correct procedures must be scrupulously followed.

As you are well aware, under Florida law, poll closing procedures are public and the public may therefore witness the proceedings, including the verification and reconciliation of counts. We have found that at the various early voting sites, while the poll closing teams seem to be willing to permit the public to witness some proceedings, they are denying the public the ability to witness others. In numerous cases, the public has been sequestered such that it could not witness the counts, the verification, the reconciliation or the reporting processes. On at least two occasions, the election boards went so far as to resort to whispering the totals in order to prevent the public from hearing them.

As you are also well aware, even though the polls are deemed closed at 7:00 p.m., anyone in line at 7:00 p.m. must be permitted to vote. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the polls cannot be officially closed until the last voter has voted. This is significant because it is the trigger for the following: 1) Allowing the public into the polls, 2) Commencing the election board's closing procedures (and not until), and 3) Securing the equipment/materials from further voting. Currently, some election boards are starting the poll closing process before all voters have finished voting and before allowing the public to enter the polls. In addition to the obvious problems associated



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with counting votes while voters are still voting, this is denying the public access to witness the closing procedures, in violation of state law.

Lastly, equipment/materials cannot be shut down or put away until counting, verification, reconciliation, and reporting are complete. Florida law requires the election board to count, verify, reconcile, and report reconciliations or lack thereof, along with any discrepancies found, as part of closing procedures. We have observed poll closing teams closing equipment and putting away materials before counts, verifications, reconciliations, and reports are complete. As you know, this has already had a negative impact in North Miami, where a discrepancy of 99 votes could not be addressed on Wednesday night because equipment/materials were put away prematurely. The election board reported further reconciliation work on Thursday morning and still more on Thursday night. The efforts to conduct the reconciliation and report the day after closing, because the equipment and materials were not available at closing, is contrary to law and has the possibility of shaking the confidence of voters.

We know that you are in the midst of running an election but believe that the issues we raise here go squarely to that very important task. We are available to discuss our concerns with you and can be reached as follows: Lida Rodriguez-Taseff 305-960-2242 and Dan McCrea 305-984-2900. It is our hope that you can provide us with written assurance that the poll closing teams are being re-educated on these issues and that these points will be re-emphasized for the poll closing teams responsible for Election Day poll closing.

Respectfully,

s/s

Lida Rodriguez-Taseff
Chair
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition

s/s

Dan McCrea
Chair, Governmental Affairs Committee
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition

cc County Manager George Burgess

Appendix C

Audit and Management Services (AMS) Report
September 28, 2004

Memorandum



Date: September 28, 2004

To: Honorable Betty Ferguson, Chair
Elections Subcommittee

From: George M. Burgess
County Manager

Subject: Elections Readiness

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Burgess", written in a cursive style.

For your information and review, attached is an Interim Audit Report prepared by the Audit and Management Services Department dated September 28, 2004, regarding post-election analysis and parallel testing.

Attachment


c: Honorable Alex Penelas, Mayor
Honorable Chairperson Barbara Carey-Shuler, Ed.D., and Members,
Board of County Commissioners
Alina T. Hudak, Assistant County Manager
Cathy Jackson, Director, Audit and Management Services Department
Constance Kaplan, Supervisor of Elections
Charles Anderson, Commission Auditor
Christopher Mazzella, Inspector General

Memorandum



Date: September 28, 2004

To: George M. Burgess
County Manager

From: 
Cathy Jackson, Director
Audit and Management Services Department

Subject: Interim Audit Report - Post-Election Analysis and Parallel Testing

As promised in our August 26, 2004 preliminary report (Attachment I), the Audit and Management Services Department (AMS) has completed analysis of precinct register voter signature information for 31 precincts cited by the ACLU. You may recall that, based on its review of the September 2002 election, the ACLU alleged votes had been "lost" at these predominantly African-American precincts, as register signatures exceeded ballots cast by 1,544. We examined the same data and found a variance of only 221.

We have since expanded our testing to include similar data from the November 5, 2002, March 9, 2004 and August 31, 2004 elections, and are pleased to report that variances between register signature counts and ballots cast have decreased significantly since September 2002 to six (0.03% variance), seven (0.14% variance) and nine (0.09% variance), respectively (Schedule I). Of 44 additional precincts for which testing is underway, 28 have been completed to date with similar positive results (Schedule II). While we would prefer to see no discrepancies, these results are encouraging and within an acceptable tolerance. Nonetheless, we have recommended the Elections Department use this information to train or counsel Precinct Clerks to further reduce discrepancies.

Our examination of election audit data contained in the Ballot Image and Event Logs commenced September 21st and, while analysis of this information is ongoing, we have successfully matched 1,689 ballot transactions from 668 machines recorded by AMS auditors to the Event Logs. We expect to conclude testing and communicate results in our final post-election testing report before the end of November 2004.

With regard to Parallel Testing, we assisted the Elections Department in developing a test plan (Attachment II), which has been submitted to the State for approval. This plan calls for conducting the parallel test on Election Day (November 2, 2004) in the vacant store in the lobby of the Stephen P. Clark Center building using five iVotronics representing three precincts. AMS will assist with random precinct/voting machine selection and ballot script development, as well as monitor testing activities throughout the 7:00 am to 7:00 pm voting day. It is anticipated that approximately 500 scripted ballots will be cast during the test period.

In summary, based on our observations, the August 31, 2004 election was successful and, while opportunities for improvement exist, nothing came to our attention that would cast doubt on the election results. A more comprehensive report on our August 31st election observations, including audit data and other post-election testing, will be issued sometime following the November election. Please note we

Interim Audit Report –
Post-Election Analysis and Parallel Testing
Page 2

have informally communicated findings from August 31st to the Elections Department to facilitate planning for November.

CJ:rmb

Attachments

c: Honorable Harvey Ruvin, Clerk of the Courts
Alina T. Hudak, Assistant County Manager
Constance A. Kaplan, Supervisor of Elections
Christopher Mazzella, Inspector General
Charles Anderson, Commission Auditor

Audit and Management Services Department
 Analysis of Voter Signature Counts to Ballots Cast for 31 ACLU-tested Precincts

Precinct	September 10th 2002 Election				November 5th 2002 Election				March 9th 2004 Election				August 31st 2004 Election			
	Signatures on Register (a)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (b)	Variance from Canvass Report (a-b)=(c)	Percentage Difference (c/a)%	Signatures on Register (d)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (e)	Variance from Canvass Report (d-e)=(f)	Percentage Difference (f/d)%	Signatures on Register (g)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (h)	Variance from Canvass Report (g-h)=(i)	Percentage Difference (i/g)%	Signatures on Register (j)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (k)	Variance from Canvass Report (j-k)=(l)	Percentage Difference (l/j)%
30	884	880	4	0.45%	950	947	3	0.32%	347	347	-	0.00%	571	576	(5)	-0.88%
46	387	379	8	2.07%	492	492	-	0.00%	131	134	(3)	-2.29%	251	248	3	1.20%
111	792	779	13	1.64%	1,025	1,025	(3)	-0.29%	572	582	(10)	-1.75%	437	428	9	2.06%
124	693	683	10	1.44%	1,076	1,082	(6)	-0.56%	231	230	1	0.43%	492	483	9	1.83%
135	1,337	1,243	94	7.03%	1,430	1,412	18	1.26%	270	275	(5)	-1.85%	703	703	-	0.00%
140	459	438	21	4.58%	523	521	2	0.38%	88	90	(2)	-2.27%	242	247	(5)	-2.07%
159	639	637	2	0.31%	716	709	7	0.98%	194	194	-	0.00%	362	362	-	0.00%
162	295	276	19	6.44%	404	404	(1)	-0.25%	70	66	4	5.71%	212	218	(6)	-2.83%
206	653	672	(19)	-2.91%	783	782	1	0.13%	165	166	(1)	-0.61%	429	431	(2)	-0.47%
212	264	275	(11)	-4.17%	364	375	(11)	-3.02%	179	178	1	0.56%	305	301	4	1.31%
213	656	651	5	0.76%	767	767	-	0.00%	186	186	-	0.00%	453	452	1	0.22%
214	717	700	17	2.37%	914	913	1	0.11%	223	223	-	0.00%	520	520	-	0.00%
215	556	550	6	1.08%	651	653	(2)	-0.31%	158	160	(2)	-1.27%	370	368	2	0.54%
224	614	611	3	0.49%	660	661	(1)	-0.15%	151	153	(2)	-1.32%	362	364	(2)	-0.55%
228	530	527	3	0.57%	553	553	(2)	-0.36%	121	123	(2)	-1.65%	239	240	(1)	-0.42%
235	790	792	(2)	-0.25%	1,085	1,080	5	0.46%	249	251	(2)	-0.80%	530	533	(3)	-0.57%
243	575	589	(14)	-2.43%	666	667	(1)	-0.15%	139	142	(3)	-2.16%	328	326	2	0.61%
244	566	548	18	3.18%	650	655	(5)	-0.77%	123	124	(1)	-0.81%	354	357	(3)	-0.85%
261	569	550	19	3.34%	560	560	-	0.00%	155	154	1	0.65%	370	370	-	0.00%
411	440	454	(14)	-3.18%	625	625	1	0.16%	26	27	(1)	-3.85%	354	363	(9)	-2.54%
431	345	344	1	0.29%	497	499	(2)	-0.40%	49	49	-	0.00%	300	300	-	0.00%
507	414	408	6	1.45%	483	484	(1)	-0.21%	121	124	(3)	-2.48%	281	283	(2)	-0.71%
511	547	550	(3)	-0.55%	613	617	(4)	-0.65%	166	166	-	0.00%	364	364	-	0.00%
517	249	244	5	2.01%	305	304	1	0.33%	77	77	-	0.00%	148	148	-	0.00%
521	860	862	(2)	-0.23%	872	872	-	0.00%	286	284	2	0.70%	548	553	(5)	-0.91%
548	486	483	3	0.62%	712	712	-	0.00%	54	52	2	3.70%	478	479	(1)	-0.21%
591	421	431	(10)	-2.38%	572	576	(4)	-0.70%	100	99	1	1.00%	455	455	-	0.00%
722	5	4	1	20.00%	14	11	3	21.43%	1	1	-	0.00%	3	4	(1)	-33.33%
771	408	351	57	13.97%	542	543	(1)	-0.18%	85	86	(1)	-1.18%	253	252	1	0.40%
828	654	665	(11)	-1.68%	786	790	(4)	-0.51%	192	177	15	7.81%	497	497	-	0.00%
833	624	632	(8)	-1.28%	723	723	-	0.00%	191	187	4	2.09%	481	476	5	1.04%
Totals:	17,429	17,208	221	1.27%	21,008	21,014	(6)	-0.03%	5,100	5,107	(7)	-0.14%	11,692	11,701	(9)	-0.08%

**Audit and Management Services Department
Analysis of Voter Signature Counts to Ballots Cast for 28 Randomly Selected Precincts**


Precinct	March 9th 2004 Election				August 31st 2004 Election			
	Signatures on Register (a)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (b)	Variance from Canvass Report (a - b) = (c)	Percentage Difference (c/a) %	Signatures on Register (d)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (e)	Variance from Canvass Report (d - e) = (f)	Percentage Difference (f/d) %
13	136	138	(2)	-1.47%	332	326	6	1.81%
238	12	11	1	8.33%	25	27	(2)	-8.00%
239	233	234	(1)	-0.43%	611	612	(1)	-0.16%
258	122	124	(2)	-1.64%	236	238	(2)	-0.85%
304	121	119	2	1.65%	544	544	-	0.00%
320	56	57	(1)	-1.79%	676	678	(2)	-0.30%
339/380	63	62	1	1.59%	768	771	(3)	-0.39%
352	374	372	2	0.53%	1,326	1,325	1	0.08%
360	26	27	(1)	-3.85%	481	478	3	0.62%
372	30	31	(1)	-3.33%	145	145	-	0.00%
427	52	52	-	0.00%	450	453	(3)	-0.67%
531	41	42	(1)	-2.44%	165	167	(2)	-1.21%
562	56	58	(2)	-3.57%	757	750	7	0.92%
601	78	79	(1)	-1.28%	416	416	-	0.00%
608	84	85	(1)	-1.19%	513	515	(2)	-0.39%
705	71	71	-	0.00%	536	544	(8)	-1.49%
706	56	56	-	0.00%	539	539	-	0.00%
759	283	278	5	1.77%	1,234	1,225	9	0.73%
827	115	114	1	0.87%	349	356	(7)	-2.01%
829	43	43	-	0.00%	179	179	-	0.00%
835	76	78	(2)	-2.63%	306	310	(4)	-1.31%
837	129	125	4	3.10%	552	552	-	0.00%
845	63	62	1	1.59%	174	172	2	1.15%
851	47	48	(1)	-2.13%	145	137	8	5.52%
911	62	61	1	1.61%	197	199	(2)	-1.02%
931	49	49	-	0.00%	245	241	4	1.63%
975	23	23	-	0.00%	63	65	(2)	-3.17%
Totals:	2,501	2,499	2	0.08%	11,964	11,964	-	0.00%

Memorandum

MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY

Date: August 26, 2004

To: George M. Burgess
County Manager

From: 
Cathy Jackson, Director
Audit and Management Services Department

Subject: Preliminary Results – AMS Precinct Register Analysis

As directed, the Audit and Management Services Department (AMS) has analyzed the September 2002 precinct register voter signature information cited by the ACLU, in which it was alleged that 1,544 votes from 31 predominantly African-American precincts were "lost." Having completed its review of this same information, AMS determined that aggregate voter signatures for these precincts exceeded ballots cast by 221, rather than the 1,544 reported by ACLU (see Schedule attached). This represents an average of seven per precinct, which did not materially impact election results. The maximum discrepancy reported by AMS was 94 (Precinct 135), and the minimum occurred at Precinct 206, where ballots cast exceeded register signatures by 19. Further, nine of the 31 precincts chosen by ACLU had less than 5% African-American registration. In fact, at predominantly African-American Precinct 135, the variance of 94 represented just 7.03% of total precinct register signatures, while at Precinct 771, where African-Americans constitute less than 4% of registered voters, signatures exceeded ballots cast by 13.97%.

Through analysis and auditor observations on election day September 10, 2002, AMS attributes these relatively minor differences to voters who may have arrived at their precincts before pollworkers were able to activate the iVotronics, which at some locations were not operational for several hours beyond the scheduled 7:00 am opening. Some of these voters signed precinct registers with the intention of casting ballots, but were unable to wait for voting machines to be activated, resulting in a precinct register signature absent a corresponding ballot cast. It must be emphasized that iVotronic activation was a significant issue at many precincts in the September 2002 election.

AMS consulted with Elections Department officials to confirm that its analytical methodology for counting voter signatures was correct. Since the ACLU did not disclose its testing procedures or detailed results, it appears the organization may have misinterpreted as signatures those register notations indicating the status of Absentee Ballots and early voting (Attachment I).

This analysis is ongoing and a final report will be issued no later than September 15, 2004.

CJ:rmc

Attachments

Audit and Management Services Department
Comparison of Voter Signature Counts for 31 ACLU-tested Precincts
September 10th 2002 Election

Precinct	For Americans Civil Liberties Union (ACLU)					Per Audit and Management Services (AMS)						
	Voters Signing In (a)	Votes Cast (b)	Votes Lost (c-d)	Percent Lost	Registered Voters	African-American Voters	Percent African-American	Signatures on Register (d)	Ballots Cast per Canvass Report (e)	Variance from Canvass Report (d-e)=(f)	Percentage Difference (f/d) %	ACLU Signature Over-statement (a-d)
30	1,007	880	127	12.61%	2,476	21	0.85%	884	880	4	0.45%	123
46	433	379	54	12.47%	1,487	45	3.03%	387	379	8	2.07%	46
111	850	779	71	8.35%	2,960	62	2.09%	792	779	13	1.64%	58
124	751	683	68	9.05%	2,621	31	1.18%	693	683	10	1.44%	58
135	1,432	1,243	189	13.20%	3,272	2,232	68.22%	1,337	1,243	94	7.03%	95
140	472	438	34	7.20%	1,227	672	54.77%	459	438	21	4.58%	13
159	655	637	18	2.75%	1,448	756	52.21%	639	637	2	0.31%	16
162	310	276	34	10.97%	893	681	76.26%	295	276	19	6.44%	15
206	689	672	17	2.47%	2,002	1,496	74.73%	653	672	-19	-2.91%	36
212	289	275	14	4.84%	898	497	55.35%	264	275	-11	-4.17%	25
213	680	651	29	4.26%	1,866	1,482	79.42%	656	651	5	0.76%	24
214	750	700	50	6.67%	2,077	1,611	77.56%	717	700	17	2.37%	33
215	562	550	12	2.14%	1,402	1,042	74.32%	556	550	6	1.08%	6
224	656	611	45	6.86%	1,812	1,459	80.52%	614	611	3	0.49%	42
228	550	527	23	4.18%	1,335	1,174	87.94%	530	527	3	0.57%	20
235	811	792	19	2.34%	2,724	1,428	52.42%	790	792	-2	-0.25%	21
243	601	589	12	2.00%	1,526	1,210	79.29%	575	589	-14	-2.43%	26
244	583	548	35	6.00%	1,756	1,308	74.49%	566	548	18	3.18%	17
261	606	550	56	9.24%	1,697	1,595	93.99%	569	550	19	3.34%	37
411	549	454	95	17.30%	1,873	21	1.12%	440	454	-14	-3.18%	109
431	408	344	64	15.69%	1,234	4	0.32%	345	344	1	0.29%	63
507	440	408	32	7.27%	1,200	1,140	95.00%	414	408	6	1.45%	26
511	578	550	28	4.84%	1,623	1,542	95.01%	547	550	-3	-0.55%	31
517	311	244	67	21.54%	1,014	511	50.39%	249	244	5	2.01%	62
521	923	862	61	6.61%	2,045	1,916	93.69%	860	862	-2	-0.23%	63
548	579	483	96	16.58%	1,530	9	0.59%	486	483	3	0.62%	93
591	495	431	64	12.93%	1,515	243	16.04%	421	431	-10	-2.38%	74
722	5	4	1	20.00%	25	0	0.00%	5	4	1	20.00%	0
771	408	351	57	13.97%	1,234	49	3.97%	408	351	57	13.97%	0
828	697	665	32	4.59%	2,137	969	45.34%	654	665	-11	-1.68%	43
833	672	632	40	5.95%	1,909	1,728	90.52%	624	632	-8	-1.28%	48
Total:	18,752	17,208	1,544		52,818	26,934	50.99%	17,429	17,208	221		1,323

Appendix D

Results Tapes from Precinct 816

??

Terminal S/N: V5114252->
PEB S/N PS122458-
Software Version 7.5.2.0
Created 06/30/04 22:38
Copyright ES&S, Inc. 1993-2002
All Rights Reserved
Diagnostic check completed: OK
iVotronic I

816-0/816-1

TAPS
DID NOT MATCH
Results Report
new tape
Ran 11-5-04
of Amos Upp
I IVO not closed

GENERAL ELECTION
POLLING LOCATION REPORT

Total Public Count:

947

Number of Terminals Opened:
Individual Voter Terminal Data

S/N V5115238

Public Count:

12
1

Protective Count:

58

OPENED 16:57:17 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:20:45 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count:

0

S/N V5116871

Public Count:

85

Protective Count:

278

OPENED 16:58:44 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:23:39 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count:

0

S/N V5114178

Public Count:

81

Protective Count:

292

OPENED 17:00:00 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:25:56 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count:

0

S/N V5105875

Public Count:

89

Protective Count:

270

OPENED 17:01:22 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:28:52 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count:

0

S/N V5118818

Public Count:

91

Protective Count:

481

OPENED 17:03:20 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:32:03 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count:

0

S/N V5118121

Public Count:

34

Protective Count:

338

OPENED 17:05:01 11/01/2004

NOT CLOSED

S/N V5113370

Public Count:

84

Protective Count:

379

OPENED 17:07:03 11/01/2004

CLOSED 19:45:08 11/02/2004

Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5111395 (X) Public Count: 80
Protective Count: 331

OPENED 17:09:14 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:49:09 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5111972 (X) Public Count: 86
Protective Count: 257

OPENED 17:09:55 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:50:36 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5117328 (X) Public Count: 84
Protective Count: 318

OPENED 17:11:39 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:54:14 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5116182 (X) Public Count: 83
Protective Count: 476

OPENED 17:13:17 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:57:24 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5114252 (X) Public Count: 97
Protective Count: 556

OPENED 17:15:23 11/01/2004
CLOSED 20:00:26 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

PRECINCT: PRECINCT 818-0 ✓
Public Count: 1019
Ballot Style Counts
Ballot Style #81 1019

PRESIDENT FED
(Vote for 1) Total: 1014
REP-George W. Bush 243
DEM-John F. Kerry 764
Michael A. Peroutka 1
Michael Badnarik 1
David Cobb 0
James Harris 0
Walter F. Brown 1
Ralph Nader 4
UnderVotes For Above contest: 5

US SEN WIS
(Vote for 1) Total: 988
REP-Mel Martinez 224
DEM-Betty Castor 734
Dennis F. Bradley 29

>JESUS LOPEZ			
>Write-ins in above contest:			1
UnderVotes For Above contest:			31
ST ATT CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		955
REP-Al Millian			195
DEM-Katherine Fernandez Rundle			699
Gary Rosenberg			61
UnderVotes For Above contest:			64
PUB DEF CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		926
REP-Gabriel Martin			243
DEM-Bennett H. Brummer			683
UnderVotes For Above contest:			93
ST SEN SS 039			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		938
REP-Joseph E. Delaney			211
DEM-Larcenia J Bullard			727
UnderVotes For Above contest:			81
MAYOR CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		938
Carlos A. Alvarez			354
Jimmy Morales			584
UnderVotes For Above contest:			81
RET NO.1 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		831
YES 73			630
NO 74			201
UnderVotes For Above contest:			188
RET NO.2 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		818
YES 76			512
NO 77			306
UnderVotes For Above contest:			201
RET NO.3 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		821
YES 79			622
NO 80			199
UnderVotes For Above contest:			168
RET NO.4 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		820
YES 82			623
NO 83			197
UnderVotes For Above contest:			193
RET NO.5 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		819
YES 85			651
NO 86			168
UnderVotes For Above contest:			200
CIRC JUDGE DIST 11 GRP 40 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		814
William L. Thomas			444
Catherine B. Parks			370
UnderVotes For Above contest:			205

SB MEM SB 09			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		881
Evelyn Greer			618
Cindy Lerner			263
UnderVotes For Above contest:			138
AMD NO.1 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		942
YES 163			532
NO 184			410
UnderVotes For Above contest:			77
AMD NO.2 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total :		875
YES 186			508
NO 187			367
UnderVotes For Above contest:			144
AMD NO.3 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		945
YES 169			413
NO 170			532
UnderVotes For Above contest:			74
AMD NO.4 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		946
YES 172			572
NO 173			374
UnderVotes For Above contest:			73
AMD NO.5 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		962
YES 175			843
NO 178			119
UnderVotes For Above contest:			57
AMD NO.6 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		918
YES 178			457
NO 179			461
UnderVotes For Above contest:			101
AMD NO.7 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total		941
YES 181			820
NO 182			121
UnderVotes For Above contest:			78
AMD NO.8 STA			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		337
YES 184			503
NO 185			334
UnderVotes For Above contest:			82
CTY BD NO.1 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		902
FOR BONDS 187			671
AGAINST BONDS 188			231
UnderVotes For Above contest:			117
CTY BD NO.2 CW			
(Vote for 1)	Total:		911
FOR BONDS 190			705
AGAINST BONDS 191			206

UnderVotes For Above contest:		108
CTY BD NO.3 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	900
FOR BONDS 193		864
AGAINST BONDS 194		236
UnderVotes For Above contest:		119
CTY BD NO.4 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	902
FOR BONDS 196		872
AGAINST BONDS 197		230
UnderVotes For Above contest:		117
CTY BD NO.5 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	911
FOR BONDS 201		757
AGAINST BONDS 202		154
UnderVotes For Above contest:		108
CTY BD NO.6 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	893
FOR BONDS 204		849
AGAINST BONDS 205		244
UnderVotes For Above contest:		126
CTY BD NO.7 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	913
FOR BONDS 207		750
AGAINST BONDS 208		163
UnderVotes For Above contest:		106
CTY BD NO.8 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	918
FOR BONDS 210		706
AGAINST BONDS 211		211
UnderVotes For Above contest:		103

PRECINCT: PRECINCT 816-1		
Public Count:		12
Ballot Style Counts		
Ballot Style #82		12
PRESIDENT FED		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
REP-George W. Bush		5
DEM-John F. Kerry		7
Michael A. Peroutka		0
Michael Badnarik		0
David Cobb		0
James Harris		0
Walter F. Brown		0
Ralph Nader		0
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
US SEN WIS		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
REP-Mel Martinez		2
DEM-Betty Castor		10
Dennis F. Bradley		0
>Write-ins in above contest:		0

UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
ST ATT CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
REP-Al Millan		2
DEM-Katherine Fernandez Rundle		8
Gary Rosenberg		2
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
PUB DEF CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
REP-Gabriel Martin		2
DEM-Bennett H. Brummer		10
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
ST SEN SS 039		
(Vote for 1)	Total	12
REP-Joseph E. Delaney		2
DEM-Larcenia J Bullard		10
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
ST REP SH 114		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
REP-Anitere Flores		4
DEM-Millie Herrera		8
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
MAYOR CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
Carlos A. Alvarez		5
Jimmy Morales		7
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
RET NO.1 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	9
YES 73		6
NO 74		3
UnderVotes For Above contest:		3
RET NO.2 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	9
YES 76		6
NO 77		3
UnderVotes For Above contest:		3
RET NO.3 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	9
YES 79		8
NO 80		1
UnderVotes For Above contest:		3
RET NO.4 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	0
YES 82		6
NO 83		4
UnderVotes For Above contest:		2
RET NO.6 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	10
YES 85		10
NO 86		0
UnderVotes For Above contest:		2
CIRC JUDGE DIST 11 GRP 40 CW		

(Vote for 1)	Total:	10
William L. Thomas		5
Catherine B. Parks		5
UnderVotes For Above contest:		2
SB MEM SB 09		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	11
Evelyn Greer		7
Cindy Lerner		4
UnderVotes For Above contest:		1
AMD NO. 1 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 163		7
NO 164		5
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 2 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 166		9
NO 167		3
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 3 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 169		5
NO 170		7
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 4 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 172		8
NO 173		6
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 5 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	11
YES 175		10
NO 176		1
UnderVotes For Above contest:		1
AMD NO. 6 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 178		8
NO 179		4
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 7 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 181		11
NO 182		1
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
AMD NO. 8 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
YES 184		7
NO 185		5
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0
CTY BD NO. 1 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	12
FOR BONDS 187		11
AGAINST BONDS 188		1
UnderVotes For Above contest:		0

CTY BD NO.2 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 190 11
 AGAINST BONDS 191 1
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.3 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 193 11
 AGAINST BONDS 194 1
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.4 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 196 10
 AGAINST BONDS 197 2
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.5 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 201 11
 AGAINST BONDS 202 1
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.6 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 11
 FOR BONDS 204 9
 AGAINST BONDS 205 2
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 1

CTY BD NO.7 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 207 10
 AGAINST BONDS 208 2
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.8 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 12
 FOR BONDS 210 11
 AGAINST BONDS 211 1
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

Time/Date: 20:23:09 11/02/2004

Signature: 

Signature: 

Signature: _____

Signature: 

1 ETO NOT
TAPE
raw by D...
11-5-04

VERIFIED
11-8-04
DR

816

Terminal S/N: S5103521-C
PEB S/N PS122458-
Software Version 7.5.2.0
Created 06/30/04 22:38
Copyright ES&S, Inc. 1993-2002
All Rights Reserved
Diagnostic check completed: OK
iVotronic I

GENERAL ELECTION
POLLING LOCATION REPORT

Total Public Count: 1032

Number of Terminals Opened: 12

Individual Voter Terminal Data

S/N V5115238
Public Count: 1
Protective Count: 58
OPENED 16:57:17 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:20:45 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5116871
Public Count: 85
Protective Count: 276
OPENED 16:58:44 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:23:39 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5114178
Public Count: 81
Protective Count: 292
OPENED 17:00:00 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:25:56 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5105875
Public Count: 89
Protective Count: 270
OPENED 17:01:22 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:28:52 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0


S/N V5116619
Public Count: 91
Protective Count: 481
OPENED 17:03:20 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:32:03 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5116121
Public Count: 84
Protective Count: 338
OPENED 17:05:01 11/01/2004
NOT CLOSED

S/N V5113370
Public Count: 84
Protective Count: 379
OPENED 17:07:03 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:45:08 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5111395
Public Count: 80
Protective Count: 331
OPENED 17:09:14 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:49:09 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5111972
Public Count: 86
Protective Count: 257
OPENED 17:09:55 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:50:36 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0



Public Count: 80
Protective Count: 331
OPENED 17:09:14 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:49:09 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5111972

Public Count: 86
Protective Count: 257
OPENED 17:09:55 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:50:36 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5117328

Public Count: 84
Protective Count: 318
OPENED 17:11:39 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:54:14 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5116182

Public Count: 83
Protective Count: 476
OPENED 17:13:17 11/01/2004
CLOSED 19:57:24 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

S/N V5114252

Public Count: 97
Protective Count: 556
OPENED 17:15:23 11/01/2004
CLOSED 20:00:26 11/02/2004
Coded Ballot Count: 0

PRECINCT: PRECINCT 816-0
Public Count: 1102
Ballot Style Counts
Ballot Style #81 1102

PRESIDENT FED

(Vote for 1) Total: 1097
REP-George W. Bush 264
DEM-John F. Kerry 826
Michael A. Peroutka 1
Michael Badnarik 1
David Cobb 0
James Harris 0
Walter F. Brown 1
Ralph Nader 4
UnderVotes For Above contest: 5

US SEN WIS

(Vote for 1) Total: 1069
REP-Mel Martinez 249
DEM-Betty Castor 789
Dennis F. Bradley 30

>JESUS LOPEZ

>Write-ins in above contest: 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 33

ST ATT CW

(Vote for 1) Total: 1031
REP-Al Milian 210
DEM-Katherine Fernandez Rundle 755
Gary Rosenberg 66
UnderVotes For Above contest: 71

PUB DEF CW

(Vote for 1) Total: 1000
REP-Gabriel Martin 263
DEM-Bennett H. Brummer 737
UnderVotes For Above contest: 102

ST SEN SS 039

(Vote for 1) Total: 1011
REP-Joseph E. Delaney 229
DEM-Larcenia J Bullard 782

Early Rosenbergs 00
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 71

PUB DEF CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 1000
 REP-Gabriel Martin 268
 DEM-Bennett H. Brummer 737
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 102

ST SEN SS 039
 (Vote for 1) Total: 1011
 REP-Joseph E. Delaney 229
 DEM-Larcenia J Bullard 782
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 91

MAYOR CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 1012
 Carlos A. Alvarez 381
 Jimmy Morales 631
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 90

RET NO.1 STA
 (Vote for 1) Total: 898
 YES 73 687
 NO 74 211
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 204

RET NO.2 STA
 (Vote for 1) Total: 884
 YES 76 552
 NO 77 332
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 218

RET NO.3 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 887
 YES 79 677
 NO 80 210
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 215

RET NO.4 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 887
 YES 82 677
 NO 83 210
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 215

RET NO.5 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 887
 YES 85 705
 NO 86 182
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 215

CIRC JUDGE DIST 11 GRP 40 CW
 (Vote for 1) Total: 878
 William L. Thomas 476
 Catherine B. Parks 402
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 224

SB MEM SB 09
 (Vote for 1) Total: 949
 Evelyn Greer 668
 Cindy Lerner 281
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 153

AMD NO.1 STA
 (Vote for 1) Total: 1016
 YES 163 577
 NO 164 439
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 86

AMD NO.2 STA
 (Vote for 1) Total: 943
 YES 166 547
 NO 167 396
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 159

AMD NO.3 STA
 (Vote for 1) Total: 1022
 YES 169 445
 NO 170 577
 UnderVotes For Above contest: 80

AMD NO.4 STA

AMD NO. 2 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	943
YES 166		547
NO 167		396
UnderVotes For Above contest:		159
AMD NO. 3 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	1022
YES 169		445
NO 170		577
UnderVotes For Above contest:		80
AMD NO. 4 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	1022
YES 172		622
NO 173		400
UnderVotes For Above contest:		80
AMD NO. 5 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	1040
YES 175		910
NO 176		130
UnderVotes For Above contest:		62
AMD NO. 6 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	989
YES 178		492
NO 179		497
UnderVotes For Above contest:		113
AMD NO. 7 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	1016
YES 181		886
NO 182		130
UnderVotes For Above contest:		86
AMD NO. 8 STA		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	1010
YES 184		652
NO 185		358
UnderVotes For Above contest:		92
CTY BD NO. 1 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	973
FOR BONDS 187		722
AGAINST BONDS 188		251
UnderVotes For Above contest:		129
CTY BD NO. 2 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	982
FOR BONDS 190		760
AGAINST BONDS 191		222
UnderVotes For Above contest:		120
CTY BD NO. 3 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	968
FOR BONDS 193		718
AGAINST BONDS 194		250
UnderVotes For Above contest:		134
CTY BD NO. 4 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	971
FOR BONDS 196		730
AGAINST BONDS 197		241
UnderVotes For Above contest:		131
CTY BD NO. 5 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	982
FOR BONDS 201		819
AGAINST BONDS 202		163
UnderVotes For Above contest:		120
CTY BD NO. 6 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	961
FOR BONDS 204		704
AGAINST BONDS 205		257
UnderVotes For Above contest:		141
CTY BD NO. 7 CW		
(Vote for 1)	Total:	984
FOR BONDS 207		812
AGAINST BONDS 208		172

Under Votes For Above contest: 131

CTY BD NO.5 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 982
FOR BONDS 201 819
AGAINST BONDS 202 163
UnderVotes For Above contest: 120

CTY BD NO.6 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 961
FOR BONDS 204 704
AGAINST BONDS 205 257
UnderVotes For Above contest: 141

CTY BD NO.7 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 984
FOR BONDS 207 812
AGAINST BONDS 208 172
UnderVotes For Above contest: 118

CTY BD NO.8 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 988
FOR BONDS 210 766
AGAINST BONDS 211 222
UnderVotes For Above contest: 114

PRECINCT: PRECINCT 816-1
Public Count: 14
Ballot Style Counts
Ballot Style #82 14

PRESIDENT FED
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-George W. Bush 6
DEM-John F. Kerry 8
Michael A. Peroutka 0
Michael Badnarik 0
David Cobb 0
James Harris 0
Walter F. Brown 0
Ralph Nader 0
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

US SEN WIS
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-Mel Martinez 2
DEM-Betty Castor 12
Dennis F. Bradley 0
>Write-ins in above contest: 0
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

ST ATT CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-Al Milian 2
DEM-Katherine Fernandez Rundle 9
Gary Rosenberg 3
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

PUB DEF CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-Gabriel Martin 2
DEM-Bennett H. Brummer 12
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

ST SEN SS 039
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-Joseph E. Delaney 2
DEM-Larcenia J Buillard 12
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

ST REP SH 114
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
REP-Anitere Flores 5
DEM-Millie Herrera 9
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

MAYOR CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
Carlos A. Alvarez 5

MAYOR CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
Carlos A. Alvarez 5
Jimmy Morales 9
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

RET NO.1 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 11
YES 73 7
NO 74 2
UnderVotes For Above contest: 3

RET NO.2 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 11
YES 76 8
NO 77 3
UnderVotes For Above contest: 3

RET NO.3 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 11
YES 79 10
NO 80 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 3

RET NO.4 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 12
YES 82 8
NO 83 4
UnderVotes For Above contest: 2

RET NO.5 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 12
YES 85 12
NO 86 0
UnderVotes For Above contest: 2

CIRC JUDGE DIST 11 GRP 40 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 12
William L. Thomas 6
Catherine B. Parks 6
UnderVotes For Above contest: 2

SB MEM SB 09
(Vote for 1) Total: 13
Evelyn Greer 8

SB MEM SB 09
(Vote for 1) Total: 13
Evelyn Greer 8
Cindy Lerner 5
UnderVotes For Above contest: 1

AMD NO.1 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 163 8
NO 164 6
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.2 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 166 11
NO 167 3
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.3 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 169 6
NO 170 8
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.4 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 172 8
NO 173 6
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.5 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 13
YES 175 12
NO 176 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 1

AMD NO.6 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 178 9
NO 179 5
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.7 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 181 13
NO 182 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

AMD NO.8 STA

AMD NO.8 STA
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
YES 184 8
NO 185 6
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.1 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 187 13
AGAINST BONDS 188 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.2 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 190 13
AGAINST BONDS 191 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.3 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 193 13
AGAINST BONDS 194 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.4 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 196 12
AGAINST BONDS 197 2
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.5 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 201 13
AGAINST BONDS 202 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.6 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 13
FOR BONDS 204 11
AGAINST BONDS 205 2
UnderVotes For Above contest: 1

CTY BD NO.7 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 207 12
AGAINST BONDS 208 2
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

CTY BD NO.8 CW
(Vote for 1) Total: 14
FOR BONDS 210 13
AGAINST BONDS 211 1
UnderVotes For Above contest: 0

Time/Date: 18:20:01 11/05/2004

Signature: -----

Signature: -----

Signature: -----

Signature: -----

Appendix E

Certificate No. 2 from Precinct 816

CERTIFICATE NO. 2

(To be filled out and signed by the Election Board
AFTER THE CLOSING OF THE POLLS)

WE HEREBY CERTIFY

That on this 2 day of NOV, 2004, as soon as the polls were closed, we carefully examined the ballot box and found it to be sealed and the seal number to correspond respectively to the number entered on Certificate No. 1

That we have counted the number of signatures in the precinct registers and found them to total: 534

That the ballot box has been emptied of all voted provisional ballots and has been ascertained by the election board to be so emptied and that voted and unvoted provisional ballots and the Ballot Accountability Form of Voting Precinct No(s) 8/61 in the County of Miami-Dade and State of Florida, have been duly and properly packed in the ballot transfer case and that said case was sealed with a numbered seal registered as follows.

PCT NO 8/61 SEAL NO ~~0022448~~ 0018535

That we verified that the Master Activator, Zero Tapes, Results Tapes and all iVotronic Flash Cards were packed in the Results Bag and sealed with a numbered seal registered as follows.

SEAL NO 0044015

That the Demonstration and Ballot Activators were packed in the Activator Cases and sealed with numbered seals registered as follows

SEAL NO's 0022534

That the Ballot Transfer Case, Activator Cases, and Results Bag stand ready to be turned over to the Supervisor of Elections

We, the undersigned, Inspectors, Assistant Clerk and Clerk of Voting Precinct No (s) 8/61 in the County of Miami-Dade and the State of Florida, do hereby certify that the foregoing statements are true in all respects

- | | | |
|---------------------------|------------------------|----------|
| 1 <u>[Signature]</u> | 8 <u>Margie Black</u> | 15 _____ |
| 2 <u>[Signature]</u> | 9 <u>Ida M. Brown</u> | 16 _____ |
| 3 <u>[Signature]</u> | 10 <u>Tia K. Cole</u> | 17 _____ |
| 4 <u>Yvrose Ligonde</u> | 11 <u>George Green</u> | 18 _____ |
| 5 <u>Barbara Mitchell</u> | 12 _____ | 19 _____ |
| 6 <u>[Signature]</u> | 13 _____ | 20 _____ |
| 7 <u>Connie Wilson</u> | 14 _____ | 21 _____ |

Inspectors
[Signature]
Assistant Clerk

Inspectors
[Signature]
Clerk

We, the undersigned, Clerk and Assistant Clerk or Inspector of Voting Precinct No(s) 8/61 in the County of Miami-Dade and the State of Florida, will transport the sealed Activator Cases and Clerk's Kit to the Collection Center designated for this precinct. Additionally, I, the undersigned, Election Specialist will transport the Laptop Computer, Ballot Transfer Case and the sealed Results Bag containing the Master Activator, Zero Tape, Results Tapes and all Flash cards to the Collection Center designated for this precinct

ASSISTANT CLERK OR INSPECTOR:
[Signature]
Print Name of Assistant Clerk
[Signature]
Assistant Clerk's Signature
Time of Departure _____

CLERK:
[Signature]
Print Name of Clerk
[Signature]
Clerk's Signature

ELECTIONS SPECIALIST

Print Name of Election Specialist

Election Specialist Signature
Time of Departure _____

Appendix F

**MDERC October 27, 2004 Letter to
Secretary of State Glenda Hood**



miami-dade election reform coalition

October 27, 2004

Secretary of State Glenda Hood
R.A. Gray Building
500 S. Bronough
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0250
Via fax 850-245-6125

Dear Secretary Hood:

We, at the Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition, are writing in response to the Department of State's Emergency Rule 1 SER04-1 (the "Emergency Manual Recount Rule"). Florida law demands accuracy in every election, not only in close elections where recounts might be necessary. Put simply, every vote must count, and every voter's voice must be heard every time, not just in close contests. The only way to make sure every vote counts every time is to get the count right the first time. Sadly, however, Florida has not followed its own laws to be absolutely certain that all votes have been tabulated correctly.

Recounting Votes

The point of counting undervotes is to see whether *the voter recorded a choice for a candidate or question* which should be included in the final results. A manual recount procedure should find any ballots that *did* show a choice for an office or issue that have gone untabulated, and the rule should provide procedures to search for any recorded votes not tabulated. The Emergency Manual Recount Rule states: "(e) "undervote" means that *the tabulator recorded no vote for the office or issue* or that the elector did not designate the number of choices allowed for the office or issue." 1SER04-1(4)(e). This definition includes ballots in which votes were recorded by voters in the memory of the machine but not tabulated in the election system, and ballots in which recorded votes were not downloaded or tabulated properly. The Emergency Manual Recount Rule fails to compare the number of voters to the number of ballots cast, to identify uncounted ballots showing definite choices by voters for candidates or issues.' It fails to specify the way in which ballot image reports will be obtained for the recount, which is an important matter of computer security, and therefore also fails to address the possibility that the ballot images available for recounting may be affected if some machines are not downloaded properly into the election management system.

'This comparison is a manual process. The definition of "manual" includes both "done by, used by, or operated with the hands," and "employing human rather than mechanical energy." American Heritage Dictionary 1066 (4th Ed. 2000).



miami-dade election reform coalition

Florida has now experienced two known forms of uncounted electronic votes during elections. Among many problems in the September 2002 primary, thousands of votes in Miami-Dade and Broward counties were not downloaded and tabulated at the poll closing. In the August 31, 2004 election in Hillsborough County, 245 votes cast on electronic ballots were discovered after the election was certified. Ted Byrd, "245 Votes in Primary Originally Uncounted," Tampa Tribune, September 18, 2004. The failure to count those 245 votes was caused by two problems: first, a poll worker mistakenly left the machine in "test mode," which prevented the election management system from adding these votes to the tabulation; second, procedures in the precinct and the canvassing board failed to detect and correct the problem before certification. These known problems have not yet been addressed adequately in the state rules and procedures for counting and recounting votes.

Correcting Counting Errors

Electronic voting is relatively new in Florida. Just as the "test mode" problem had not been reported before the most recent election, no one can foresee every problem that might emerge to leave some recorded votes uncounted during tabulation. A recount rule must, at a minimum, include procedures that address known problems, including failure to download properly and exclusion from tabulation when in "test mode," and that will also be able to count votes if a new problem occurs. It is both common-sense and efficient to investigate discrepancies between voters and counted votes, especially because the procedures specified in the Emergency Manual Recount Rule may be difficult to accomplish within the time stated in the rule unless the voting system can sort undervotes for review—a question which is not clear from the text of the Emergency Manual Recount Rule.²

If we accept that the purpose of a recount rule is to try to capture all of the instances in which the voter recorded a choice for a candidate or question which were not (but should have been) included in the final results, then it stands to reason that the goal

²If the voting systems do not sort or identify undervotes, the Emergency Manual Recount Rule may require review of every ballot image from machines that showed undervotes or in entire precincts where any undervotes were counted. "As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for larger counties to meet the certification deadlines if circumstances warrant a manual recount of *all* ballots." Florida Senate, Committee on Ethics and Elections, Review of the Voting Irregularities of the 2000 Presidential Election, at 19 (2001) (describing the difficulty of meeting a 7-day certification deadline). The deadline for certification of general election results has now been changed to eleven days, Fla. Stat. § 102.112(2), but a huge number of new voters increased the number of ballots to be counted in large counties. Miami-Dade has added more than 160,000 voters in four years (from 896,912 in November 2000 to 1,048,801 in October 2004), and Broward County had added more than 120,000 at the time of the August 31 primary (from 887,664 in November 2000 to 1,011,310 in August 2004).

miami-dade election reform coalition

of a sound voting system is to "get it right the first time" so that accurate final results are not relegated to instances where the contest is so close that a manual recount is necessary. In fact, as set forth below, this is exactly what Florida law requires.

Ballot Accounting

Florida law has several safeguards which should ensure that uncounted votes are caught and corrected. The law calls for ballot accounting at the close of the polls, to "verify the number of voted ballots, unused ballots, provisional ballots, and spoiled ballots" and report any difference between the number of these ballots and the number of ballots issued by the supervisor.³ The term "ballot" includes electronic ballots.⁴ Unlike paper ballots, electronic ballots are not numbered or counted before being sent to the precincts by the supervisor of elections--they are contained in the voting machines and activated one-by-one for each voter. The only way to account for them is to compare the number of voters who signed in to the number of ballots cast. In Hillsborough County, the 245 votes cast in "test mode" were discovered after the election when officials compared the number of signatures to the number of votes cast. If election officials had accounted for all the voted ballots during the initial tabulation from the early voting precinct that included the machine left in "test mode, " they would have found and counted the missing ballots immediately.

Despite the statutory requirement to account for voted ballots, the Polling Place Procedures Manual does not include a procedure for accounting for voted electronic ballots in DRE counties, counting signatures of voters, or explaining any gaps between these figures. ⁵ The Manual mandates ballot accounting for all ballots in optical scan counties, but only accounts for provisional ballots in DRE counties. Florida Polling Place Procedures Manual, at 12-13. In DRE counties, therefore, the total number of voted ballots is not verified in the ballot accounting process outlined in the Manual--only the voted, spoiled, and blank provisional ballots--even though the statute clearly requires verifying the number of voted ballots. The point of this statute is not accounting for

³As soon as the polls are closed, the election board shall secure the voting devices against further voting. The election board shall thereafter, in the presence of members of the public desiring to witness the proceedings, verify the number of voted ballots, unused ballots, provisional ballots, and spoiled ballots to ascertain whether such number corresponds with the number of ballots issued by the supervisor. If there is a difference, this fact shall be reported in writing to the county canvassing board with the reasons therefor if known." Fla. Stat. § 101.5614(1) (emphasis added).

⁴ See Fla. Stat. § 101.5603(2) (defining a "ballot" as "the card, tape, or other vehicle upon which the elector's choices are recorded").

⁵A rule governing security procedures requires the election board to account for signature slips received at the polls. 1S-2.015(5)(j)(2)(I) FAC.

miami-dade election reform coalition

paper-it is verifying the correctness of ballot totals.⁶ The statute calls for the election board to bring any discrepancy to the attention of the canvassing board. The crucial task of highlighting differences in the ballot count cannot be fulfilled if only paper ballots are accounted for in DRE counties.

It is most troubling that uniform practices of ballot accounting are not being carried out around the state. The 245 votes in Hillsborough are one example. The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition obtained and reviewed polling place certificates for Miami-Dade County from the August 31, 2004 election, and we found that poll workers had failed to record the number of signatures at more than 70 polling places. The failure of the Polling Place Procedures Manual to direct poll workers to account for all ballots may have caused the failures in Hillsborough and in Miami-Dade-and we have no way to know how many similar problems may have gone undiscovered.

If obvious errors or omissions appear during the canvass, the precinct in which they are found must be recounted.⁷ If the county canvassing board determines that there may have been an error in which the vote tabulation system failed to count votes that were properly marked in accordance with instructions on the ballot, the board must correct the error and recount the affected ballots.⁸ But finding these errors depends on good procedures in the precincts. If discrepancies are not identified and reported to the canvassing board, the board may miss errors or failures to count properly marked ballots.

⁶ Before September 2002, this provision stated that the election board should open the ballot box and "count" the ballots. The revised statute focused removed the reference to the ballot box and replacing the term "count" with "verify." Chapter 2002-17, sec. 15. To "verify" means "1) to prove the truth of by presentation of evidence or testimony... 2) to determine or test the truth or accuracy of, as by comparison, investigation, or reference." American Heritage Dictionary 1911 (4th Ed. 2000). These changes require the board to look at evidence to confirm the accuracy of the number of ballots shown in their records-they should verify the number of ballots in comparison with the number of voters.

⁷ "If the returns from any precinct are missing, if there are any omissions on the returns from any precinct, or if there is an obvious error on any such returns, the canvassing board shall order a recount of the returns from such precinct." Fla. Stat. § 102.141(3).

⁸ "If the county canvassing board determines that the unofficial returns may contain a counting error in which the vote tabulation system failed to count votes that were properly marked in accordance with the instructions on the ballot, the county canvassing board shall: (a) Correct the error and recount the affected ballots with the vote tabulation system; or (b) Request that the Department of State verify the tabulation software...." Fla. Stat. § 102.141(5).



miami-dade election reform coalition

The failure to count 245 votes in Hillsborough County was obvious-but only *after the signatures were compared with the vote tallies*. The counting of signatures and reporting of discrepancies to the canvassing board are fundamental to counting votes correctly. Furthermore, unless the first count includes all votes, it may not be clear whether the election is close enough to trigger a recount throughout the jurisdiction.

Immediate Action Needed

The Coalition calls on the Department of State to take immediate steps to "get it right the first time" across the state of Florida. Clarify for all Supervisors of Elections that ballot accounting in the precincts should verify the number of all voted ballots, including a comparison between the number of ballots and the number of voters who signed in-and that any discrepancies must be reported to the canvassing board along with explanations if known. If other ballot accounting measures are necessary to verify the number of voted electronic ballots-for example, a log showing events in which voters sign in but leave without voting or demand that their ballots be cancelled-then those procedures should be identified as well.

Sincerely,

Martha R. Mahoney
Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition
305-284-5869

Appendix G

Memo from Supervisor of Elections w/cover letter
from County Manager


May 6, 2005

Memorandum



Date: May 6, 2005

To: Honorable Mayor Carlos Alvarez
Honorable Chairman Joe A. Martinez and Members
Board of County Commissioners

From: George M. Burgess 
County Manager

Subject: Issue regarding November 2, 2004, General Election

I want to inform you of an issue that has arisen regarding the November 2, 2004, General Election. Our new Supervisor of Elections, Lester Sola, has detailed the issue to the best of his current knowledge in a memorandum to me (attached). As you can see, he has already begun the process of understanding exactly what took place, and he is working closely with Director Cathy Jackson of Audit and Management Services (AMS) and her staff to further research the issue. I have emphasized to Mr. Sola and Ms. Jackson the importance of this task, and they have assured me that they fully understand.

Understandably, media interest has arisen regarding this issue. I share the community's desire to have a full knowledge of what took place – and to confirm that if, in fact, there was a difference in the number of voters who signed in and the number of ballots cast at a precinct, the issue was confined to that one precinct. That currently appears to be the case; Mr. Sola and Ms. Jackson are working to confirm the extent, if any, of the impact of this situation. The Supervisor of Elections expects any discrepancies to be extremely limited and isolated but wants to confirm through this audit. It is also my expectation that our Supervisor will outline procedures to prevent this from happening in the future.

As always, I will continue to update you as I receive further information. If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me.

Attachment

c: Robert Ginsburg, County Attorney
Alina T. Hudak, Assistant County Manager
Murray Greenberg, First Assistant County Attorney
Lester Sola, Supervisor of Elections
Cathy Jackson, Director, Audit and Management Services
Christopher Mazzella, Inspector General
Charles Anderson, Commission Auditor

Memorandum


MIAMI-DADE
COUNTY

Date: May 6, 2005

To: George M. Burgess
County Manager

From: Lester Sola
Supervisor of Elections

Subject: Issue regarding November 2, 2004, General Election



I want to update you regarding what I have learned about an issue that was reported in today's Daily Business Review. I am currently in the process of gathering more information regarding this issue. I will, of course, provide more details as soon as possible, but at this time I want to provide you with this interim report of what I currently know.

As was reported, at the end of each voting day, precinct Clerks are required to count the number of people who signed in to vote in the precinct register. This number can later be used as a tool to be compared with the number of ballots cast in the precinct to detect any discrepancies between the two numbers and, thus, any potential issues. As was also reported, in certain cases, the numbers reported by the Clerks differed from the total number of ballots cast. A difference can occur because of two main reasons: 1) the total number of ballots cast may actually differ from the number of voters who signed in, either because a voter signed in and did not cast a ballot or because a pollworker failed to have the voter sign the register, or 2) the Clerk may have miscounted the signatures. Generally speaking, large differences have occurred because of clerical errors (and subsequent recounts of the actual signatures reveal that the number closely matches the number of ballots cast), while small differences of a few votes can occur because of clerical errors or other factors that occur in an election (i.e., a voter signing in but not casting a ballot). Pollworkers complete the process of counting up to thousands of signatures at the end of a long day, and clerical errors do occur. Following the election, Elections Department staff electronically scan the signatures in our precinct registers, and the numbers reflected in that count become the official record of the number of voters who signed in at each precinct.

While most differences can be attributed to clerical or other errors, preliminarily, I am aware of a precinct where the number of ballots cast, as reported in our official canvass report, does appear to differ from the number of voters who signed in to vote at that location. At Precinct 816, Church of the Ascension, 11201 SW 160th Street, our registers indicate that 945 voters signed in at the polls, and yet the canvass report shows 1,116 ballots cast. A review of events at that precinct indicates the following: One iVotronic terminal experienced a malfunction that caused precinct personnel to be unable to close the terminal and collect votes from it using standard procedures. Elections Department personnel at our headquarters were later able to retrieve those votes using an alternative method. The audit logs of activity from that precinct, including the machine in question, indicate a total of 945 ballots cast – matching the expected number based on voters who signed the precinct registers. At this time, we are unsure why the total number of ballots cast as indicated on the canvass report is 171 ballots higher (1,116 compared with 945) than the number of voters that our records indicate signed in to vote.

Separately, the iVotronic unit in question was later taken by Elections Department personnel, accompanied by staff from Audit and Management Services and the state Division of Elections, to a laboratory in Rockford, Illinois, for further testing. Our vendor, Election Systems & Software (ES&S), stated that it would provide a report on its findings to the state. I have called officials at the state, who have informed me that they have received a preliminary report and are awaiting a final report. They say indications are that one internal memory bank in the unit failed, but redundancies in place

functioned properly and recorded the votes. In fact, as I indicated, audit logs do indicate the same number of votes as voters who signed in; what we continue trying to ascertain is why a different total was reported on the official canvass report.

As I mentioned, we have been in contact with the Secretary of State's Division of Elections and they have informed me that they will be here on Monday, May 9th, to review these findings with me. Upon the conclusion of this review, I will provide you with additional information.

Additionally, I am reviewing means by which we can improve the accuracy of the certificates completed by our pollworkers – and how that information can be more efficiently used as a “red flag” to indicate potential issues. Currently, our training materials inform pollworkers that they are to count and record the number of signatures. Training staff have informed me that pollworkers are also orally instructed to report any large discrepancies between the number of signatures and the number of ballots cast as indicated on the electronic “public count” reported from the iVotronic units. We will further formalize that process and include it in our written training materials. Small differences between the two numbers do not necessarily indicate systemic problems, but we must be aware of those differences so that we can properly assess whether a need for concern exists. Prospectively, I intend, to the extent possible, to integrate all records – including precinct records completed by our pollworkers as well as our audit data – and use that information to verify that the numbers of ballots cast in each precinct reflect what would be expected based on the number of voters who signed in.

These are the details as I best understand them at this moment. I will inform you immediately as soon as I have more information.

cc: Alina Tejada Hudak, Assistant County Manager
Cathy Jackson, Director, Audit and Management Services

Appendix H

Report from ES&S on their December 2004 study
of Events Regarding iVotronic #V5116121

FAX



*To: MARIA MATTHEWS
From: Lester Sola*

**Department of State
Office of the General Counsel
The R. A. Gray Building, Room 123
500 South Bronough Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32399-0250**

Date 6/10/05

Number of pages including cover sheet 11

To: Lester Sola

Miami-Dade SOE

Phone # [REDACTED]

Fax # [REDACTED]

From: Maria Matthews

Assistant General Counsel

Phone # _____

Fax # _____

REMARKS

Per Your Request For your review Reply ASAP Per Conversation

Per your request, please find attached the info. you sought from ES&S.



To: *Ms. Maria Matthews* From: *Tim Hallett* Sender:

Company: *Florida Dept. of State* Pages: *10* (Includes Cover Sheet)

Fax: *850-245-6127* Date: *5-9-05*

RE: _____ CC: _____

Urgent For Review Please Comment Please Reply Please Recycle

Comments:

Please let me know if you have any questions.

Thank you.
Tim

"Maintaining Voter Confidence. Enhancing the Voting Experience."

11208 John Galt Boulevard, Omaha, Nebraska 68137-2364 USA
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www.esvote.com

May 9, 2005

VIA FACSIMILIE: (850) 245-6127

Ms. Maria I. Matthews, Esq.
Assistant General Counsel
Department of State
R.A. Gray Building
500 South Bronough Street
Tallahassee, Florida 32309-0250

RE: Public Records Request

Dear Ms. Matthews:

Election Systems & Software, Inc. ("ES&S") has reviewed the attached document and concluded that the information contained therein is not exempt from public disclosure under Title X, Chapter 119.07, of the Florida Public Records Statutes. In addition to the attached document, ES&S has included a document summarizing the events which took place with the Ivotronic unit utilized in precinct #616 for the November 2, 2004 General Election. ES&S respectfully requests this document be disclosed with the requested information. Please let me know if you have any questions or need any additional information.

Sincerely,

Timothy J. Hallett

cc: Eric A. Anderson, Esq. - ES&S
Ken Carbullido - ES&S

Summary of Events Regarding iVotronic #V5116121, Used in Miami Dade for the November 2, 2004 General Election

During the week of December 13, 2004, members of the Florida Division of Elections, Representatives of Miami-Dade County, and ES&S engineers reviewed information and data from an iVotronic terminal, serial number V5116121, which was used in Miami-Dade, precinct # 816, for the November 2, 2004 General Election. The review showed that one of the three redundant EEPROM flash memories in the iVotronic terminal had failed during the terminal closing process. No votes were lost and all electronic vote image records were intact in the first of three redundant EEPROM flash memories. While it is very rare for such hardware flash memories to fail, the iVotronic is designed with three EEPROM flash memories for triplicate redundant storage of the electronic vote images. This triplicate redundant storage provides the fail safe mechanism needed in order to contain and keep the vote images intact when one of the flash memory fails as happened in this case with the second flash memory. A review of the iVotronic audit event log indicated that the iVotronic operator attempted to close the terminal multiple times after the first closing of the terminal. Each repeated closing of the terminal resulted in the same failure and votes being harvested from that terminal, and added again into the PEB.

Several visible indicators of the failure were available. The terminal EEPROM memory failure occurred during the closing process, producing warning messages for the operator of the terminal. In addition, the paper tape results printed at the polling place provided additional data that could indicate a problem with the terminal. Also, the event log from terminal number V5116121 showed that the terminal was closed multiple times. All of these indicators were available from the iVotronic and Unity systems for Miami-Dade to use and review. Because all of the vote images are retained and collected in the terminal and in the audit data, correct vote totals can be re-derived and the election totals can be maintained.

The attached report Worksheet for Diagnostic Sessions Held at ES&S, Rockford, IL, Dec. 13-15, 2004 provides the technical details behind the analysis.

Worksheet for Diagnostic Sessions Held at ES&S, Rockford IL Dec. 13-15, 2004

Date: 12-15-04

Florida Contacts:	Donald Liopia -	Miami Dade County
	Bob Vinock -	Miami Dade County
	Kate McGregor -	FL State
	Rebekah Neitzel -	FL State
	Caroline Malkinski -	FL State
	David Drury -	FL State

ES&S Contacts:	Herb Deutsch -	(Software Product Manager)
	Jack Adams -	(Director of Development)
	Rhoda Fox -	(Sr. Software Dev. Eng.)
	Paul Hain -	(Sr. Software Dev. Eng.)
	Mike Dvorak -	(Electrical Eng. - Omaha)
	Chuck Sitenga -	(Sr. Software Dev. Eng.)
	Brian Lyngaas -	(Software Technician)

Additional Contacts:

Internal Tracking Number: HDW24617

Product: iVotronic
Firmware Version: 7.5.2.0
Terminal Serial Number: V5116121 (from General)
Date of Election: November 2, 2004

Problem Description:

1. Inconsistent data between 3 eproms

2. Events not matching images

3. PEB allows accumulation of multiple vote images

4. Original data sent to ES&S was corrupt. Flash #2 appears to be bad.

5. ERM Report differs from the iVotronic PEB Results Tape

Worksheet for Diagnostic Sessions Held at ES&S, Rockford IL Dec. 13-15, 2004

Initial Analysis:

Unexplainable mass corruption in eproms #2 and #3. Ballot data found in place of events and images. Eprom #1 data appeared to be correct. Need to verify if the actual data in EPROM #2 and EPROM #3 are correct..

On election night, Miami-Dade used the data from the PEB and uploaded it into ERM. ERM reported 84 votes. (PEB data is obtained from Flash #3.) When the Audit Data was collected from Flash #1, 85 votes were retrieved from the terminal.

State of Terminal:

Not Closed; Open

Terminal Usage (History / Other Problems with Unit):

ES&S Initial Findings:

Analyst: _____

- Flash #1 - d013E - Image
- Flash #2 - d013E - Partial Image
- Flash #3 - d013E - Missing Image
- All three missing an Event

Possible Explanations:

Analyst: _____

Flash #2 is bad.

Worksheet for Diagnostic Sessions Held at ES&S, Rockford IL Dec. 13-15, 2004

Data Collected from terminals and PEBs:

Original compact flash dump
C:\Elecdata\V5116121\adt_5116121_unit

Copy of compact flash from Bob
C:\Elecdata\V5116121\Bob's Data

Compact flash dumped here in Rockford when the unit closed
C:\Elecdata\V5116121\Compact Flash

Serial dump of EPROM #1
C:\Elecdata\V5116121\Serial

Copy of full Election flash
C:\Elecdata\V5116121\official_Election_Compact Flash

FAX of tape results from PEB

Printed report from ERM

Worksheet for Diagnostic Sessions Held at ES&S, Rockford IL Dec. 13-15, 2004

Explanation (Hardware, Firmware, Utilities):

1. Inconsistent data between 3 eproms

An Image was not successfully stored to Flash #2. In config, a partial image was stored. And, no image was stored to Flash #3. (See item 2 below for the reason.) This caused the three audit files to be dumped to the compact flash.

2. Events not matching Images

When the image failed to be saved to Flash #2, the terminal ran the Emergency Close Logic. A fault in the Emergency Close Logic shut the machine down but did not save the Emergency Close Mode within the config. This allowed the machine to continue to be used. The result was a missing event.

3. PEB allows accumulation of multiple vote images

When closing, the bad sector in Flash #2 caused the terminal to execute the Emergency Close Logic, which did not shut the machine down. It continued the close process with the wrong unit mode. The wrong unit mode prevented the closing time and date from being stored to the PEB. Accordingly, this allowed multiple accumulations to the PEB to occur.

4. Original data sent to ES&S was corrupt. Flash #2 appears to be bad.

The unit dumps a bad audit file from Flash #2. This happens for an audit dump done from either the Service Screen or a terminal close.

5. ERM Report differs from the iVotronic PEB Results Tape

- The PEB data is uploaded from Flash #3.
- Serial data is uploaded from Flash #1.
- Audit data is written to the Compact Flash from either Flash #1 or Flash #2.
- The firmware's Flash #1 is the hardware's U3 EPROM chip.
- The firmware's Flash #2 is the hardware's U4 EPROM chip.
- The firmware's Flash #3 is the hardware's removable U2 EPROM chip.

Appendix I

Forms for reporting poll closing observations



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Instructions for Observing the Closing of the Early Voting Polls In Miami-Dade County's 2004 General Election

Thank you so much for helping the Miami-Dade Election Reform. We will be observing poll closings around Miami-Dade County for Early Voting General Election 2004. We are particularly grateful to those of you who are not already members of the Election Reform Coalition—we greatly appreciate your help.

The Public Is Allowed To Observe But Not Interfere

The closing of polls is a public event but some clerks and poll workers may not be accustomed to members of the public coming to observe. Observers should be lined up outside the polls before 7 p.m., even though you shouldn't be allowed in until after the last voter has voted. Observers should introduce themselves to the Poll Deputy at the door, and explain that they are there to observe the closing of the polls.

It's important to assure the Pollworkers you understand you are not to interfere with their work. Remember that Pollworkers are trying to finish important work at the end of a long, hard work day. The Miami-Dade Election Reform Coalition is grateful for the hard work Pollworkers do on behalf of the voters of Dade County, and observers can express appreciation for that work when arriving to observe.

Pollworkers are not required to talk to you, but we hope they will be friendly and cooperative. If a clerk tells you to leave them alone, or refuses to give you information, make a note of it, but back off. The public (you) has the *right to observe* the poll after it has closed, even if there are still voters in line and voting. Observe what you can, be polite, and stay until the clerk has called in the machine count numbers, the voter certificates have been tallied, and the two totals have been reconciled. Then say thank you and leave quietly. You do not need to watch until the lights go out.

NOTE: When the clerk calls in the numbers, that's a good time to record the public counts, simply by unobtrusively listening.



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INSIDE THE EARLY VOTING POLLING PLACE: People, Equipment, and Ballots

The Poll Workers:

Clerk – overall management of tasks, activities and workers.

Registrars – checks voters in at computers

Data Entry Specialists – checks voters in at computers

Demonstrator – shows voters the demo machine so they can practice

Ballot Activator – aids voters with using voting machines by activating ballot, selecting correct ballot style, language preference, etc. (often the demonstrator is also the activator)

Election Specialist (E. S.) – a computer expert responsible for operation of iVotronics and computers

Poll Deputy – keeps order at the door and outside

There may also be a Technical Specialist or a Roving Supervisor responsible for several locations.

The Equipment: The voting machines are called **iVotronics**. Most iVotronics will be set up in rows for voting. Some are **Audio iVotronics** that look like the others but have **yellow and green buttons** below the screen. Audio iVotronics can be fitted with headphones for the visually impaired voter or used by anyone just like ordinary iVotronics.

The iVotronics should be separated into three groups for this election, with signs that say: N001–N033, N034–N066, or N067–N100. These groups refer to ballot styles, which are determined by the voter's precinct. The pollworker should take each voter to a machine in their correct group depending on that voter's ballot style.

Each polling place will have at least one Demonstration iVotronic (**Demo**) which should be placed separately from the machines used to cast real votes.

Curbside Voting: Curbside voting is provided to voters who have difficulty coming inside. When requested, pollworkers take an iVotronic out to a voter's car and allow them to cast their ballot from there. Ask the pollworkers how many voters voted using curbside voting, and if Curbside Voting caused any problems.



Reconciling the Counts:

The poll workers are not supposed to start doing end of the day counts and closing down machines until after the last voter has voted.

The Public Count (Machine Count): Each machine keeps a record of votes cast on it and displays the count on the screen. After the polls close, pollworkers, working together in pairs, should collect this “public count” from each machine and record it on a form. You should watch this closely, write down the totals on your own worksheet if possible, observe the care taken and the accuracy of the math done by pollworkers. **(Note: These are NOT the results of the election – just a count of how many voters cast ballots on each machine. It’s illegal for anyone to release results before the closing of the polls on Election Day, Nov. 2nd.)**

The Voter Certificates (Paper Count): The Registrars and Data Entry Specialists screen the voters as they enter the poll, and give the voters the number of the ballot style they will be using to vote. Each voter fills out and signs a **Voter Certificate**. After the polls close, pollworkers count the certificates by hand. You should observe how carefully this is being done and note any problems.

Reconciling: The total public count should be the same as the total number of voter certificates. It is very important to observe the comparison of these two numbers and what the pollworkers do if they do not match.

Other Ballots:

Ask the Clerk about the use of **Absentee Ballots**, **Provisional Ballots**, and **Substitute Paper Ballots** and mark the information on your worksheet. Try to determine if there were problems using these ballots.



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CONTACT INFO:

Urgent incident reports:

Brandon Patton 718-744-4163

Rachel Berney Needleman 305-798-7233

Dan McCrea 305-984-2900

Please fax your 2-page EVC Worksheet as soon as possible, to 305-667-8155

Or bring them to the next Wednesday MDERC meeting.

Or mail them to:

Dan McCrea

6200 SW 63rd Court

South Miami, FL 33143

Email incident reports should be sent promptly to brandonpatton@optonline.net or faxed to the fax number above.

For scheduling, please contact:

Rachel Berney Needleman 305-798-7233

mdercpollclosings@yahoo.com



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Early Voting Poll Closing (EVC) Worksheet *NOT final day of site Ver 4.0 PAGE 1 of 3
Miami-Dade County General Election of 2 November 2004

About You and Your Location

Day & Date:			
Your Early Voting Location:			
Time Arrived and Departed:	Arr.:	Dep.:	
Your Name:			
Your best phone numbers:			
Your email:			

About Pollworkers

Total No. of Pollworkers on site:		As of what time:	
Clerks:	Deputies:	Election Specialists:	
Registrars:	Demonstrator/Activators:		
Data Entry Specialists:	Other (couldn't determine):		

About Equipment

Total No. of iVotronics:		In Use For Voting:	Audio:	Demo:
		Broken:	Unused:	
No. By Ballot Style Grouping:	N001-N033:	N034-N066:	N067 - N100:	

iVotronics Notes (incidents, time occurred, what was observed):

No. of computers in use to check voters in:

Computer Notes (incidents, time occurred, what was observed):

About Ballots

Total iVotronic Public Count:		Total of Voter Certificates:	
Absentee ballots:	Used:	Spoiled:	Unused:
Substitute: ballots:	Used:	Spoiled:	Unused:
Provisional ballots:	Used:	Spoiled:	Unused:

Additional Observations and Notes (use back if needed)

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Y	N	?	Poll Closing Checklist	Ver 4.0 PAGE 2 of 3
			Did the clerk wait until the last voter had finished voting before declaring the poll closed?	
			Did the poll workers wait until the last voter had finished voting before beginning poll closing procedures? (procedures follow below)	
			1. Clerk checks each machine, in order by serial number, writes down public count of each machine on security form.	
			2. For each machine, the Election Specialist (ES) inserts RED PEB into machine, enters override password to lock machine, then removes PEB.	
			3. Other poll workers close down the voting flaps, machine case.	
			4. Each machine is sealed with locking plastic band, and the clerk writes the serial number of each seal on her security form.	
			5. The RED PEBs put away into activator case, case sealed.	
			6. Individual machine public counts are totaled.	
			7. Clerk calls in the individual machine public count totals.	
			8. The voter certificates are totaled. If the total is different than the public count total, they investigate the cause.	
Notes:				



Election Day Poll Closing (EDAY) Worksheet – Observer "A"			
Miami-Dade County General Election of 2 November 2004			
About You and Your Location			
Day & Date:			
Polling Place Address:			
Precinct(s):			
Times:	Arrived:	Departed:	
	Last voter finished voting:	Public could enter poll:	
Your Name:			
Your best phone numbers:			
Your email:			
About Pollworkers			
Total No. of Pollworkers on site:		As of what time:	
Clerks:	Deputies:	Election Specialists:	
Assistant Clerks:	Inspectors:		
Other (couldn't determine):			
Was there anyone there who works for the Div. of Elections in Tallahassee?			
About Ballots			
Total iVotronic Public Count:		Total Signatures in Register:	
No. of computers in use to check voters in:			
Provisional ballots:	Used:	Spoiled:	Unused:
Substitute ballots:	Used:	Spoiled:	Unused:
Absentee ballots:	Cancelled:		
Notes:			



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EDAY "A" Ver. 2.0

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Date:			Location:	Your name
Y	N	?	Poll Closing Checklist	
			Did the clerk wait until the last voter had finished voting before allowing the public in?	
			Did the poll workers wait until the last voter had finished voting before beginning poll closing procedures?	
Y	N	?	"A" Observer Checklist - The Paper	
			Were the signatures in the register totaled?	
			Were any hand written poll worker notes accidentally counted as signatures?	
			Was Certificate No. 2 filled out, including the total of signatures in registers?	
			Were the provisional ballots removed from the ballot box and placed in the ballot transfer case? (Total provisional ballots: _____)	
			Were substitute ballots (paper ballots used in case of emergencies) packed into the substitute ballot transfer case?	
			Did a poll worker verify and record the data on the results tape?	
			Did the clerk record the iVotronic data (serial number of each machine, public count of each machine) onto the security form?	
			Were individual machine public counts (total votes cast) recorded?	
			Did the number of register signatures match the public count total? (If they did not, take notes about how they reconciled the discrepancy.)	
			Did the clerk write the serial number of each seal on her security form?	
			Was a copy of the results tape posted on the entrance door to polling room?	
			When the Clerk left, did the clerk have all the correct materials? -Clerk's kit (cancelled absentee ballots envelopes, precinct registers, document folder with checklists and forms, ballot box seal). -Activator cases (boxes full of cartridges - red and green PEBs).	



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EDAY "A" Ver. 2.0

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Notes:



Election Day Poll Closing (EDAY) Worksheet – Observer "B"

Miami-Dade County General Election of 2 November 2004

About You and Your Location

Day & Date:			
Polling Place Address:			
Precinct(s):			
Times:	Arrived:	Departed:	
	Last voter finished voting:	Public could enter poll:	
Your Name:			
Your best phone numbers:			
Your email:			

About Pollworkers

Total No. of Pollworkers on site:		As of what time:	
Clerks:	Deputies:	Election Specialists:	
Assistant Clerks:	Inspectors:		
Other (couldn't determine):			
Was there anyone there who works for the Div. of Elections in Tallahassee?			

About Equipment

Total No. of iVotronics:		In Use For Voting:	Audio:	Demo:
		Broken:	Unused:	
No. of computers in use to check voters in:				

Notes

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miami-dade election reform coalition

EDAY "B" Ver. 2.0

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Date:			Location:	Your name
Y	N	?	Poll Closing Checklist	
			Did the clerk wait until the last voter had finished voting before allowing the public in?	
			Did the poll workers wait until the last voter had finished voting before beginning poll closing procedures?	
			"B" Observer Checklist - The Machines	
			Were individual machine public counts (total votes cast) recorded?	
			For each machine used for voting, did the Election Specialist (ES) insert the BLUE PEB cartridge into each machine, enter the override password to deactivate the machine, wait until the votes were fully loaded, and then remove the PEB? (This is when the votes from the machine enter the BLUE PEB, or "master activator").	
			Did the ES deactivate all iVotronics used for voting with the blue PEB cartridge <i>before</i> printing the results tape?	
			Did the ES print 3 copies of the results tape?	
			Did a poll worker verify and record the data on the results tape?	
			Was a copy of the results tape posted on the entrance door to polling room?	
			Were the flash cards removed from each iVotronic used for voting?	
			Were the voting booths disassembled and sealed with locking plastic seals?	
			Did the clerk write the serial number of each seal on her security form?	
			Were the RED PEBs put away into sealed activator cases?	
			Did the clerk call in the individual machine public count totals?	
			Did ES call Elections to say he/she was leaving?	
			Did the ES leave the precinct with the correct materials? -Ballot Transfer Case (containing provisional ballots). -a laptop. -sealed results bag (containing zero tape, 2 copies results tape, blue master activator (that holds the votes). -flash cards iVotronics.	

